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Greece lies at the focal point
of the Mediterranean world, which
is itself the area of overlap be-
tween Europe, Asia and Africa.
Pocus is a useful metaphor, for
a focus can be either a source
of heat and light or a point on
which rays converge: and Greece
has been both.
C. M. Woodhouse
The Story of Modern Greece

Relations between the United States and Greece dur-
ing the period 1967 through 1973 provide an interesting
opportunity for an analysis of the various factors in-
fluencing the policy formation process between friendly
nation states. During this time the government of Greece
had been radically altered, and the United States was in
the process of re -formulating and defending its resultant
policy towards the newly-installed government. This per-
iod of Greek/American relations can be characterized as
highly unstable, as the policies of the two countries
were subject to strong pressures from sources external
to, as well as within, each state.
The main areas of criticism were focused on the man-
ner and form of the Greek government that emerged after
the April 21st coup d'etat and the characteristics and
motives of American policy towards the ruling military
junta. Serious charges have been levied against the
United States regarding suspected American participation
in the coup, ranging from knowledge, encouragement, and
condonement of the overthrow to active participation in

the planning and execution of the takeover. While men-
tion of these criticisms will be made, a thorough evalua-
tion of the validity of these charges is considered be-
yond the scope and intent of this study.
Although it is recognized that foreign policy cannot
be viewed as operating exclusively on a bilateral basis,
for purposes of this discussion, the emphasis will be
placed on events occurring within each state and on the
international level that have a direct effect on the re-
lations between the two states.
The Greek question has proven to be an extremely emo-
tional issue. Although modern Greek history has been
largely characterized by unstable political systems, in-
cluding powerful as well as weak monarchs, periodic mili-
tary takeovers, dictatorships and civil war, she is
rightly held in esteem by westerners as the symbol of
individual human rights and the democratic tradition.
Greece is, if not in form and practice at least in spirit
and history, the "cradle of democracy." The imposition
of authoritarian government and the reported excesses
Examples of charges of varying intensities include:
Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front
(Garden City, 1970); Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek
Tragedy (Baltimore, 1969); Margaret Papandreou, Nightmare
in Athens (Englewood Cliffs, 1970); a column of Marquis
Childs quoted in Democracy at Gunpoint and originally
appearing in the Washington PosT; and the remarks of
Representative Don Edwards (Calif.) appearing in the
Congressional Record
, August 31, 1967, page 214-895.

3during its establishment in power evoked genuine sym-
pathy in western circles, and emotion played a signifi-
cant role in policies proposed in opposition to the Greek
government in power.
Largely dependent upon American support, particu-
larly military aid, the Greek situation raises ques-
tions as to American motives in providing this type of
assistance. Perhaps more crucial to American foreign
policy in general, how much can, or should, the United
States influence other sovereign states in their own
domestic affairs? And using the case of Greece's asso-
ciation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as
an example, how much effect does one state's internal
policies have on the efficacy of external alliance sys-
tems? The latter question has obtained currency through
frequent proposals to eject Greece from NATO for viola-
tion of principles of democracy contained within the or-
2ganization's charter.
Greek opposition leaders have been particularly vocal
and effective in pointing out in all available forums the
2 Recent proposals can be found in the testimony of
Representative Donald M. Fraser (Minn. ) and that of Helen
Vlachos before the House Subcommittee on Europe of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearings on Greece, Spain
and the Southern NATO Strategy (hereafter referred to as
Hearings; Greece and Spain ), (U. S. Government Printing
0ffice7 1971), pages 5^-59 and 35^-355 respectively.

kmoral, political, military and legal reasons the United
States should take overt action against the Greek govern-
ment. However, these efforts have not resulted in de-
finitive actions by the United States, rather the Amer-
ican government's official position has been explained
in terms of a dilemma. On one hand agreeing with the
necessity for Greece to return to democratic processes
while asserting that the best way to accomplish this re-
turn is through working with the government in power and
urging them back to representative government. In this
manner, strategic security interests can be protected
during this transition phase.
Because of the many and varied influences on the
formation of American foreign policy and the numerous
events concerning Greek/American relations during this
period, a brief background discussion and chronology are
considered necessary for the later analysis. Due to
space limitations, the chronology will cover only major
domestic and foreign events that have significant effect
on the bilateral situation.
Perhaps the clearest statement of American policy
is to be found in Current Foreign Policy
, "Greece: u. S.
Policy Dilemma," \]~ S. Department of State Publication
8601; (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

5Background
Modern relations between the United States and Greece
can be conveniently dated from the withdrawal of German
troops from Greece in 19kl\. and the subsequent civil war
between the royalist and the communist resistance groups.
During this period, western support was given to
the Greek monarchy in exile in Lonc*on while on- scene
assistance was given to the pro-monarchy factions by the
British Army of Occupation, the main allied military
force present in Greece. Through active British assis-
tance, the leftist National Liberation Front, the EAM,
and its armed counterpart, the ELAS, had been subdued,
and a coalition government had been formed under the
leadership of George Papandreou. Following attempts to
disarm the ELAS, the six EAM ministers resigned from the
government and called a general strike. This action led
to increased tensions and the eventual outbreak of civil
war on December l±, 19i[4.
With increased British assistance, the rebels were
eventually put down and on February 12, 19l|5, a peace
treaty was signed between warring factions at Varkiza.
^ For a discussion of these events as seen from the
Greek viewpoint, see Stephen G. Xydis, Greece and the
Great Powers 19l|J4--19l|.7 (Thessaloniki, 1963) and "America,
Britain and the USSR in the Greek Arena, 19l\l\.-19ltf ,"
Political Science Quarterly
, Vol. LXXVIII, #lj., December

6The treaty called for the disarming of the ELAS, national
elections, and a plebiscite to determine the status of
the Greek monarchy. Although the peace treaty was signed,
EAM and communist-led guerrilla activities continued
throughout the countryside. In the general elections
of March 191+6, judged by 1500 American, British, French,
and South African supervisors as a fair expression of
opinion, the rightist faction captured a large majority
in the Parliament and a September plebiscite recalled
the Greek King to his throne.
By the fall of 191+6, increasing amounts of aid to
the Greek rebels were provided by Greece's communist
neighbors, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, thereby
contributing to the increases in terror throughout the
rural areas. The terror, in turn, swelled the numbers
of refugees streaming towards the population centers,
especially the Athens area. The large numbers of refu-
gees added more stress to the already strained Greek
economy. With the need to maintain a large military to
oppose the communist forces in the north and a hereto-
fore inability to effect a workable recovery plan from
** For a further description of associated events dur-
ing this period as seen and interpreted by an American ob-
server, see Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York,
1955) especially pages 68-72.
Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, pages 73-71)..

7the destruction of World War II, the ability of the Greek
government to withstand this latest challenge was in ser-
ious doubt. In February 19^4-7 the British revealed to
American officials their inability to uphold their mili-
tary and economic commitments in providing support to
the Greeks and with the enunciation of the Truman Doc-
trine, the United States assumed an active role in the
7political and economic future of the Greek state.
Prior to the April 1967 coup, United States' rela-
tions with Greece have, by and large, been relatively
stable and generally have not been subject to large-
scale controversy and criticism. Exceptions to this
generalization have occurred during periods of Greek
domestic crisis, when attention has been focused on
the form and political orientation of the contesting
Greek factions, and during periods of Greek and Turkish
dispute over the Cyprus question.
American/Greek relations from the Truman Doctrine
to the 1967 coup have been largely concerned with three
long-range goals. First of all, the reconstruction of
the Greek economy from the destruction of the wars and
the subsequent development of the economy; secondly, the
7 For a thorough discussion of the formulation pro-
cess of American foreign policy during this period, see
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969).

8construction of a viable military force to ensure Greek
territorial security and fulfill her assigned functions
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and final-
ly, the promotion of political stability within the Greek
state in order to accomplish the first two goals in an
efficient manner. It is in the achievement of this last
goal that American means and motives have been most ser-
iously questioned.
Economic Reconstruction and Developmental Assistance
American economic assistance was inaugurated with the
report of the United States Economic Mission in February
of 19lj-7 and President Truman' s approval of an initial sum
of $2^0 million in aid to Greece. Formally the Greek
Charge d'Affaires and the Greek Embassy First Secretary
were informed that:
President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall
had decided to take measures. . .to strengthen
and restore the economic position of Greece; to
permit that country to meet its needs for re-
lief and military supplies; and to make pos-
sible the execution of long-range programs that
was expected to last for seven years. . . .The
complete and sincere cooperation of the Greek
Government was indispensable for the success
of this undertaking. . . .This cooperation
would rest on the assurance that the sugges- q
tions of the U. S. Government would be followed.
From that time through 1966, the United States provided
ft




Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, pages lj.78-Ij.79.

9Greece with $3»75>0 million in aid, about equally divided
between military and economic assistance. Of this total,
$3,^-11 million was in the form of direct grants and $339
million in loans. Major economic aid was ended in 1961j.,
while military aid continued. Military aid for fiscal
year 1967 was approximately $65 million. The adminis-
tration of aid funds was directly controlled by the Amer-
ican Economic Mission, and through prior agreements, the
Greek government was, in effect, required to obtain Amer-
ican approval before any major decision was adopted.
During the first phases of aid, this feature was accepted
by most Greeks as a small price for survival, but as the
aid program continued and the rebel threat diminished,
it became a source of irritation.
The first phases of American aid were directed at
the defeat of insurgent forces and immediate war relief.
Advances in the economic sector were predominantly re-
sults of military spin-offs, e.g. repairs and improve-
ments in the road system were necessary to support the
12
military campaigns against the rebels. By April of
J. P. C. Carey & A. G. Carey, The Web of Modern
Greek Politics
,
(New York, 1968) page ZTJI




(New York, lyyn page j>5 .
12 McNeill, American Aid in Action, page $0 .
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19if8, Greece was included within the Marshall plan for
the reconstruction of her economy, and American economic
planners had set a target date of 1952 for the attain-
ment of economic and social stability. In the Greek
situation, this target proved to be unrealistic with
the Civil War continuing until October of 19i|9. As a
result, an attempt was made to cram four years of re-
construction into two and one-half years through sub-
13
stantial increases in the amounts of aid. ^ The results
were not as successful as desired.
Aid policies and programs were directed at sectors
on a priority basis determined by the two governments.
These sectors included the forced resettlement of refu-
gees back to their home areas in order to get them off
the swollen relief rolls {22% of all Greek governmental
expenditures in 19^9 went into relief measures); trans-
portation; agricultural improvements and reform; assis-
tance to industry through a Central Loan Committee to
encourage new development; and the attainment of pre-war
industrial output levels.
The American efforts in these sectors, especially
the first three, were, by and large, successful. How-







tive reform, cooperation was lacking and measures were
largely resisted by the Greeks. As pointed out by McNeill:
Greek politicians found no real need to do more
than agree in words with American demands for
economy and reorganization in government. So
long as the Americans were prepared to pump
hundreds of millions of dollars into the econ-
omy each year, why should the Greek govern-
ment not run an unbalanced budget. . . .The
Americans would have to make the deficits
good; and if they complained. . .one could
mollify them with promises for the future.
Greeks were very much inclined to feel that
the United States owed them a great debt of
gratitude for having fought the guerrilla
Ikwar and stopped the advance of Communism.
Partly as a response to observed attitudes similar to
those quoted above, the United States became more con-
cerned with the structure of Greek government and more
overt in its attempts to influence governmental reforms
and, if failing in these efforts, to work towards its
replacement by a "more receptive" government. The ex-
pressions of these efforts were normally in the form of
threats of reduction in American aid or statements by
American representatives in Greece, criticizing Greek
use or misuse of funds and statements critical to the
political system, attempting to pressure the Greeks in-
to making desired alterations. Perhaps the most strik-
ing example of this type of pressure is the statement by
the late Ambassador John E. Peurifoy:
^ McNeill, American Aid in Action, page 61.
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Because the American government believes that
the reestablishment of the "simple proportion-
al" election method, with its unavoidable con-
sequences of the continuation of governmental
instability, would have destructive results
upon the effective utilization of American
aid to Greece, the American Embassy feels it-
self obliged to make its support publicly
known for the patriotic position of the Prime
Minister plasteras with regard to this sub-
ject. 15
Although there were recurring problems, such as in-
come distribution and urban-rural mix, by 1961j. the United
States was sufficiently pleased with Greek economic re-
covery and stability and ended American economic assis-
tance. The Greek economy had progressed from one of the
lowest standards of living in Europe to the attainment
of a fairly respectable per capita share of the Gross
National Product of $530 in 1966 and a steady growth
rate of 8% per year.
Greek/American Military Relations
In the discussion of American military assistance
to Greece, the dual nature of the national and NATO-
oriented relationships between the two countries can
be most clearly seen. During the first stages of
assistance, military aid was concerned with rebuilding
^ Public statement of Ambassador Peurifoy, published
in the Greek newspaper Elef theria , 15 March 1952 and quo-
ted in T. A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reactions to
American and NATO Influence (New Haven, 1966), page 5l±.
Carey & Carey, The Web of Modern Greek politics
,
pages l\. and 213-211;.

13
and supplying the Greek military in order that they could
effectively conduct a successful campaign against the
rebel forces. Once survival was ensured, goals were re-
oriented towards shaping Greek defenses into an efficient
force for the resistance of external pressures from her
Balkan neighbors and to assume a vital role within the
defense fabric of the NATO mantle. Greece's strategic
importance and her role within the organization will be
discussed in a later section.
With the establishment of the American Military Mis-
sion in Greece during 19^7, assistance took the form of
supplying personnel to assist in training Greek forces
17
as well as providing military hardware. ' As with any
advisory program, close contacts were established between
American and Greek officers and professional and personal
relationships were developed. This type of working arrange'
ment often results in criticism and speculation as to the
"truie role" of the advisors and the degree of political
influence and control exerted by the American military.
l ft
The Greek situation was no exception.
In addition to the technical, professional and supply




For two examples of this type of criticism and
speculation, see A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint
,
especially pages 70-73 a *id S. Rousseas, Th e Death of a
Democracy (New York, 1967 )» especially pages 33-3^»

111.
fields, the American and Greek governments have concluded
treaties regarding location of American bases and commun-
ications facilities on Greek soil as well as storage of
naval supplies and weapon site determinations. These
facilities include an Air Force Base at Athens, a com-
munications station northeast of Athens at Marathon Bay
and an Air Force station at Iraklion, Crete. NATO fa-
cilities that are available for American use include
the naval facility at Souda Bay and a nearby missile
19firing installation on Crete.
The Role of the United States in Promoting Greek
Political Stability
The degree of American participation in the promotion
and attainment of Greek political stability prior to the
1967 coup is extremely difficult to document and is largely
a subjective evaluation. As previously indicated, stable,
domestic, political conditions were considered an integral
part of the effective utilization of American aid and as
such, American officials were prone to asserting their
views into the Greek domestic theater.
It must be admitted that at times the American Em-
bassy exerted strong influence over Greek political affairs,
19 See the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hear-
ings on United States Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad, Greece and Turkey (hereafter referred to as Senate
He arings, Greece and Turkey (U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1970), pages IH03^I80ij..
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Personal contacts and public statements by Ambassador
Henry P. Grady and Ambassador Peurifoy (quoted earlier)
were used in attempts to effect reforms of the Greek
electoral system and promote what they believed to be
a healthy political system. The morality and legality
of such influences and pressures have been frequently
challenged. For example, one author has characterized
Ambassador Peurifoy as an almost sinister figure who was
11 the architect of the process of undermining the Liberals"
20through economic blackmail and open intervention. It
is perhaps an inevitable consequence that given the vast
degree of military and economic aid provided by the United
States and the active roles played by her representatives
that the Greeks should view the United States as "big
brother" and common attitudes develop in Greece that
American influence is a "recognized institution" and
that nothing happens on the Greek domestic scene without
21Washington's approval.
This view tends to gain additional confirmation when
the focus is widened to include Greek foreign policy, in-
cluding her participation in NATO and America's position
in the alliance. In addition, the interim solution of






the Cyprus dispute in 1958 giving Cyprus her independence,
and the imposition of a United Nations peacekeeping force
in 196/| are viewed by many Greeks as examples of the United
States indirectly applying measures to stabilize the Greek/
Turkish conflict to the detrement of Greece's best inter-
ests.
The events immediately preceding the April 21st coup
are of singular importance in discussing American influ-
ence in and policy towards Greece. Extensive amounts of
literature have been published concerning this period of
Greek history, a considerable share written by those who
were participants or close to those who were. As a re-
sult, the works are highly emotional and subjective in
that they are either apologia or designed to evoke sym-
pathy and/or support of a particular side to the contro-
versy. It is largely within this framework that the ma-
jority of claims are voiced that the United States played
a significant role in both furthering conditions condu-
cive to a breakdown in the democratic process and direct
support to both the "royal" and the "colonels" coups.
Most critics that are members of this school claim that
American representatives in Greece, as well as Johnson
22 For a wide variety of opinions by Greek military
and political leaders regarding Greece's relations with
the United States and NATO, see Couloumbis, Greek Political
Reaction to American and NATO Influence.

17
administration officials, wrongly believed that it was
in America's best interests to oppose the papandreous.
They insist that the Center Union Party was the first
truly effective democratic party in Greece, and their
programs and policies were misinterpreted by the United
States as threats that Greece would move away from the
western bloc. In addition, they further state that be-
cause the United States misjudged the political ambi-
tions and affiliations of Andreas Papandreou* they
colluded with the rightist opposition in efforts to dis-
23
credit him and his followers. J
Because these charges naturally flow into alleged
American complicity in the revolt, as well as providing
a basis for continued support for the regime after the
coup, a brief description of the Greek political crisis
of I96I4. to 1967 may assist in determining the factors
that have influenced American foreign policy.
George Pepandreou and the Center Union came into
power in February of 1961| on the heels of a series of
unsuccessful coalition governments that had resulted
from an inconclusive 1963 general election. As the name
indicates, the party drew its support from the center of
the political spectrum and, although having numerous in-
23




ternal factions, was held together by the figure of George
Papandreou. Although the policies of Papandreou varied
slightly from those of his right-wing predecessors, he
did tend to favor less economic dependence on the United
States, social and agricultural reforms of questionable
fiscal responsibility, and a more independent role to-
wards NATO. Regarding the latter policy, in 1965, with
the increased possibility of war with Turkey over the
Cyprus issue, Greek forces were withheld from NATO ex-
ercises thereby prompting additional speculation that
Papandreou was opposed entirely to Greek association
with the alliance. ^
Opposition from the right intensified with the Prime
Minister's acceptance of an invitation to visit the Soviet
Union and the revelation that his son, Andreas, was in-
volved in awarding a large government research project
to a close personal friend. Pressure was applied by
opposition leaders in the parliament, and the charges
were countered by charges that it was the united States
that was pressuring for Andreas' removal because they
were afraid of his liberal tendencies. This incident
revived dormant assertions that "the era when the Ameri-
^ Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy
,
page 187.
Ibid., page 185 and Carey & Carey, The Web of
Modern Greek politics, pages 196-197.
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can Ambassador determined the formation of Greek cabi-
nets has come back again." Although Andreas Papan-
dreou resigned his position in November of 196i|, by
April of the next year he was back in the government
as his father's primary deputy and heir apparent to the
aging Prime Minister's party leadership.
During his first ministerial appointment, Andreas
had taken a fairly strong position regarding enosis
27(union) of Cyprus with Greece. When he returned to
the government, his main responsibilities lay in deal-
ing with the Cyprus conflict. In his capacity of Deputy
Minister for Co-ordination, he accompanied his father to
Washington on invitation of President Johnson to discuss
the Cyprus problem. As a result of the inability of the
"little summit" to reach mutually acceptable positions,
some observers date this event as the start of intensive
activity by the CIA and the U. S. Military Mission in Greec<
to undermine and overthrow the Papandreou government.
of.
As stated in "The Events that paved the Way to a
Dictatorship," The Greek Observer (London, 1970), June-
July 1970, page~TB^
27
A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint
,
pages 129-132,
Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy
,
pages 189-190 and
Rousseas, The Death of a Democracy, pages 25-35> both
give heavy emphasis to the role played by the CIA in
Greek affairs but fail to give reliable data or docu-
mentation to prove their claims.
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On the other hand, opponents of Andreas point to his
positions towards Cyprus and his visits there after his
dismissal as the motive and the opportunity for him to
organize the leftist Army organization ASPIDA in an
attempt to overthrow the monarch and establish a "Nas-
sarite" dictatorship with Andreas as its leader.
The political battles between the government and
the opposition continued full force. investigations
were held into the administration of the previous con-
servative government, under Constantino Karamanlis,
charging financial scandals and improprieties. The
report on the Aspida plot (left wing) was published,
and Papandreou forwarded it to the judiciary accom-
panied by a report on the "Pericles" plan (right wing)
that charged election rigging in the 1961 elections.
Papandreou ordered his Defense Minister to dismiss a
list of high ranking officers; the Defense Minister
refused; Papandreou dismissed him, but the Defense
Minister refused to vacate his post.
At this point in time, recollections of the events
become noticeably varied between observers and partici-
pants. During this phase, the political situation be-
came increasingly complicated with the entrance of the
monarch into the arena. With this event the conflict
was broadened to include republican vs. monarchial is-

21
sues as well as left vs. center vs. right and government
vs. opposition.
George Papandreou presented to King Constantine his
list of Army officers to be dismissed and a proposal that
Papandreou also assume the portfolio of Defense Minister
as well as Prime Minister. Six days later Papandreou was
summoned to the royal court, and Constantine transmitted
his refusal to purge the officers or allow him to assume
the Defense Ministry while that department was conduct-
ing the investigation of Aspida and Andreas' alleged in-
volvement in the affair. Interpreting the King's posi-
tion as going well beyond his constitutional authority,
Papandreou resigned (or threatened to resign, depending
upon the recollection) and surprisingly Constantine ac-
29
cepted. Through defections from the Center Union ranks,
Constantine formed an interim government. These actions
were opposed by Papandreou on the grounds that he could
not legally form a government from the majority party,
but rather was required to dissolve parliament and call
for new general elections.
With Papandreou unceremoniously removed from power
29 For a detailed discussion of these events, see
A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint
,
pages 153-183.
-* Ibid., also Carey & Carey, The Web of Modern
Greek Politics, pages 199-204.
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sixteen months after he had obtained a majority popular
electoral victory, he immediately became the object of
increasing numbers of demonstrations on the streets of
Athens. The composition of the demonstrators was largely
made up of students and members from the center and left
of the political sphere, including workers and EDA sup-
31porters. As the demonstrations increased, the degree
of control broke down and clashes between the police
and demonstrators became common.
The interim government failed to receive a vote of
confidence as the demonstrations continued. When another
interim Prime Minister was sworn in, the demonstrations
assumed a more violent character as streets were barricaded
32
and some automobiles were turned over and burned. Af-
ter another series of no confidence votes and street dis-
turbances, Stephanopoulos was able to form a right-center
coalition with defectors from the Center Union; and after
ten weeks of near anarchy in the Parliament, as well as
in the streets, the government received a vote of confi-
33dence and order returned to Athens. -"
Remarkably the coalition held together until December
* C. M. Woodhouse, The Story of Modern Greece (Lon-
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of 1966, at which time the right believed that their chan-
ces in an electoral contest had improved sufficiently,
so they withdrew their support of the government in or-
der to force elections. Stephanopoulos resigned and re-
quested that a non-political government be appointed
and elections conducted within six months. •
During the period in which the coalition was in power,
the Center Union became more factional with Andreas lead-
ing the radicalized left wing of the party. The right
wing had previously broken and formed a new Liberal Demo-
cratic Center Party and joined in the coalition. In
addition to internal disunity, the void between the mon-
archy and the Center Union continued to grow as Andreas
tried to attract republican followers through statements
in opposition to the King. ^
Although the government was in the hands of a care-
taker Prime Minister, a governor of the Bank of Greece,
no moratorium was called on political conflict within
the Parliament and events pressed on their seemingly in-
evitable conclusion. Charges continued to be levied by
-^ Carey & Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics
,
page 208.
35 For further development, see D. G. Kousoulas, "The
Origins of the Greek Military Coup, April 1967*" Orbis
(University of Pennsylvania, 1969) Spring 1969, pages 332-






and on all segments of the political spectrum. Attacks
were followed by counterattacks, a pattern not unusual
to Greek politics. The left had its "Pericles," the
right its "Aspida," the republicans had the King's inter-
ference in parliamentary matters, the monarchists had
the political chaos. There were rumors of a leftist
coup and ones of a rightist coup. To further season
events, there were periodic bombings that the right
blamed on the left and vice versa.
Throughout these events, Andreas Papandreou contin-
ued to attack the interim government as confirmed sup-
porters of the Crown and attempted to identify American
representatives as the "real" force behind the conserva-
tive and monarchial supporters. It was over the issue
of Andreas Papandreou and his relations with ASPIDA that
the crisis came to its abrupt conclusion.
Even with a "non-political" government in power,
pressures were still applied to charge Andreas with con-
spiracy to commit treason through his alleged role in
ASPIDA. The main stumbling block to these efforts lay
in his constitutional immunity as a Parliamentary Deputy
while Parliament was in session and continued immunity
from arrest within four weeks after the dissolution of




Parliament. When Andreas' father introduced legisla-
tion extending this period of immunity to cover the en-
tire period between dissolution and general elections
(45 days), the right and the center split causing the
downfall of the interim government on March 30. Gon-
stantine attempted once more to have a minority govern-
ment formed and when the efforts of Kanellopoulos failed,
Parliament was dissolved on April ll^ and elections set
for May 28, forty-three days later. The situation had
developed where Constantine had run out of options. He
refused to turn the government over to Papandreou, who
may have been able to command a majority in Parliament,
and the only alternative was an election in which it
was widely accepted that the Center Union would again
obtain a sizable majority, perhaps larger than in 196I)..
The political arena again moved to the streets as
clashes between right and left student groups took place
and workers battled police, resulting in eighty-five
o o
persons being wounded. Rumors became louder concern-
ing the possibility of a royal coup and the imposition
of a royal dictatorship. However, when the coup was
executed, it came from sources not immediately associated
63
Jl The Constitution of Greece, 1952, Articles 62 and
** The Greek Observer, June-July 1970, page 20.
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with the Crown, and Constantine' s relationship with the
39
"Colonels' Coup" was not readily ascertained.






On the morning of April 21st, the government of
Panayotis Kanellopoulos was overthrown by a military
coup d'etat. At 6 a.m. Athens radio announced that the
military had taken power through a royal proclamation
allowed under the Greek constitution "to preserve or-
der against an obvious threat to the public security."^*
By this proclamation constitutional liberties were sus-
pended, martial law instituted and the country considered
to be in a "state of seige." Under the latter provision,
further individual rights, such as habeas corpus and
assembly, were suspended and the military government was
given extended powers of search, seizure, censorship and
the extension of courts martial jurisdiction to political
and press offenses as well as to those directed against
the army.
Supreme Court chief prosecutor C. V. Kollias was in-
stalled as Premier, and the coup's military leadership
identified and took the following offices: Lieutenant
^ For the composition of the chronology, extensive
use was made of the New York Times . Only direct quota-
tions or items of interpretation provided by contribu-
tors to news stories, editorials, etc. will be footnoted
from this source.
^ Peter Schwab and G. D. Frangos, Greece Under the
Junta (New York, 1970), page 13.
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General G. E. Spandidakis, deputy premier and defense
minister; Colonel G. Papadopoulos, minister to the
premier; Brigadier General S. Pattakos, interior and
security minister; and Colonel N. Makarezos, economic
coordination minister.
Once the government had been taken over and the
proclamation promulgated, communications were severed,
Greece's borders were closed and a large number of
political arrests of suspected leftists or communists
continued.
Earlier in the day, prior to the proclamation, the
majority of Greece's political leaders were placed un-
der house arrest. These included George and Andreas
Papandreou (Center Union), Kanellopoulos (ERE), Steph-
anopoulos, Mitsotakis (Liberal), and Passaliades (EDA).
Within the first forty-eight hours between 2^00
and 6000 political arrests were made by government for-
ces. Most prominent figures were detained in hotels in
the Athens area while the majority filled local police
stations, jails, soccer stadiums and were later trans-
ferred to Leros, Yioura and Agios Efstrastios islands.
During this time Ambassador Phillips Talbot sought
assurances that political prisoners would be properly




The United States announced on the 26th of April
that its program of economic and military aid to Greece
was under review. However, by this time, it appeared
that there was little political opposition in Greece.
The junta was firmly in place, and Constantino would
support their actions while urging an eventual return
to parliamentary government.^"
The remainder of the month in Greece was concerned
with the enunciation of the first of the junta's reform
programs and initial steps towards normalization of con-
tacts with the outside world.
In a news conference on April 28, Papadopoulos char-
acterized Greece as a patient that required surgery to
save its life and would have to be tied down during the
operation. * The first events in Greece's treatment in-
cluded the removal of the democratic left's political
party, the abolition of political youth movements and
initial planning for constitutional revision that would
create a strong, independent executive arm. Municipally-
owned land was distributed among landless farmers and em-
ployers were directed to pay traditional Easter bonuses
to workers. Diplomatically, the American and British
^ New York Times, April 26, page 1 and April 27,
page 1.
k3 New York Times
, April 28, page 3.
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Embassies recognized the appointment of Economou-Gouras
as Foreign Minister, however officially, Secretary of
State Rusk stated that the United States awaited con-
crete evidence that democratic systems would be re-
established.^"
On the domestic scene during the month of May, the
regime continued to solidify its position within Greece
while easing some of the more questionable restrictions
enforced during their first days in power such as bans
on tourists with beards and long hair. Solidification
measures included banning over 250 organizations poli-
tically oriented from liberal to pro-communist, munici-
pal and communal officials become appointive vice elec-
tive, civil service tenure was suspended for six months
to allow removal of "inefficient bureaucracy" and the
purging of the Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church.
Internationally, events were highlighted by Greek
government appeals for increases in military and econ-
omic aid from the United States; growing international
concern for the well-being of political prisoners, es-
pecially that of Andreas Papandreou as expressed by the
American economic community; and the NATO Defense Minis-
ter's meeting in Paris where Secretary McNamara reportedly
^ New York Times, April 29, page 1
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warned Greek Defense Minister Spandidakis that the United
States would cut off military aid if Greece failed to re-
turn to constitutional government.^ Other American rep-
resentatives believed that a selective embargo delaying
some arms shipments to Greece would nudge the regime back
towards democratic processes.
For the remainder of the summer, external opposition
to the Greek regime became more vocal as the government
continued to rule by decree, suppress internal opposition
and began to reply to international criticism. Expatria-
ted Greeks who were especially vocal in their opposition,
such as Melina Mercouri, were deprived of their citizen-
ship and their property confiscated, while governments
hostile towards the Greek state were threatened with
breaks in trade relations.
Internally, the government's campaign against the
political left continued with the outlawing of the music
of and later the arrest of the composer Mikis Theodorakis,
a self-proclaimed member of the Greek Communist Party and
ex-parliamentary deputy.
At the conclusion of the first six months of rule by
^ New York Times , Kay 12, page 1.
For his personal description of events during and




the junta, internal opposition had proven to be ineffec-
tive. Political opposition within the ranks of the Array
was neutralized through "selective retirements" that
were approved by the King. George Papandreou and eight
other political leaders were released, although his son
Andreas remained in custody as he had been previously
charged with conspiracy to commit treason.
Externally, ex-Premier Karamanlis finally issued a
statement opposing the military government and hinted
that he might be willing to head a new government.
December of 1967 witnessed the abortive attempt of
King Constantine to execute a counter coup. The attempt
was initiated by a radio broadcast from Larissa, announc-
ing the King's dismissal of the junta and asking the aid
of the Army in restoring democracy, and ended with the
arrival in Rome of the royal family. At this time, the
suspected power structure of the junta was revealed with
the appointment of Colonel Papadopoulos as premier and
General Patakos as Deputy Premier by Lieutenant General
Zoitakis, who they had earlier named as regent. With the
new power structure defined, the leaders resigned their
army commissions, granted amnesty to those involved in
the counter coup and opened negotiations with Constantine




over the terms for his return to Greece.
Towards the end of the month the regime, more secure
in its position, declared amnesty for most of the non-
communist political prisoners, including Andreas, lifted
house arrests of George Papandreou and P. Kanellopoulos,
and announced that a plebiscite on the new constitution
would be held early in the next year.^"
1968 :
By the end of January 1968, the united States, as
well as Great Britain, Australia, South Africa, Portugal,
Canada, and Italy had resumed normal diplomatic relations
with Papadopoulos' Greece. Later in the year the United
States resumed delivery of major military equipment,
thereby ending the "selective embargo." Other events
on the international scene concerning Greece included
the first formal charges levied against the government
concerning mistreatment and torture of political prison-
ers and the subsequent investigations by the International
Red Gross and by the Council of Europe into the Greek




situation. Domestically, the year was primarily focused
on two events, the introduction of the new Greek Constitu-
tion, and the death of George Papandreou.
The constitution, presented in July, placed the Greek
government in the hands of a strong executive branch. The
monarch was to serve the function of a "symbol of the na-
tion's unity." He would no longer appoint or dismiss
ministers, and would be the titular head of the armed
forces, which would be commanded by the government. The
armed forces would be charged with protecting the regime
and social order as well as providing for the national
defense. The real power of the state would lie in a
"Council of the Nation" composed of the premier, Speak-
er of Parliament, parliamentary party leaders, Supreme
Court President, President of the Constitutional court,
president of a body of former premiers, chiefs of the
armed forces and the deans of the three leading Greek
universities.
Parliament would be reduced to l£0 members, and no
2i9H" / For further discussions of charges of torture
of Greek political prisoners and the role played by
international bodies in investigating and reporting on
these charges, see Christopher Wren, "Greece, Govern-
ment by Torture," Look , May 27, 1969, pages 19-21;
James Becket, "Torture in Democracy's Homeland," Chris -
tianity and Crisis
, May 27, 1968, pages 115-120 and
Barbarism in Greece (New York, 1970); and John A.
Kstris, Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to
Power (St". Louis, 1971 ).
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one except the Premier and the party leaders could be
elected for four consecutive terras.
The press was forbidden to criticize the king or
the church, undermine the armed forces, assist in over-
throwing the state, propagate illegal views or promote
outlawed organizations.
In addition, motions of censure by parliament a-
gainst the Premier would be limited to intervals of no
less than one year and martial law was to continue un-
til lifted by the parliament.
The constitution was submitted to a plebiscite in
September and approved by a vote of 92% to Qfo. Although
balloting was made compulsory for all Greeks between 21
and 70 and living within 300 miles of their voting dis-
E>1trict, approximately 22^ abstained from voting. With
the death of George Papandreou, the last figure of popu-
lar political support from the pre-coup period was re-
moved from within Greek territory. Huge crowds lined
the two-mile funeral procession route and defied martial
law provisions by chanting political slogans. When a
For a thorough discussion of the 1968 Constitu-
tion, the official text and explanation as released by
the Greek government and commentary both pro and con,









group of supporters began calling for "Andreas" and down
with the junta," police forces moved in and arrested l\.0
of the demonstrators.
During the year attention was also focused on the
special military court that tried A. Panaghoulis for the
attempted assassination of Papadopoulos . Panaghoulis
was convicted and sentenced to death. Under Greek mili-
tary law, the sentence is required to be carried out be-
fore a firing squad within 72 hours. Through interna-
tional appeals, including those of Pope Paul and the
United Nations Secretary General, Panaghoulis was given
an indefinite stay of execution by the Greek government.
1969 :
Internal Greek events during 1969 were characterized
by increased acts of terrorism by government opposition
forces and the government's resotration of some basic
rights.
The large majority of terrorist activities were di-
rected against American personnel and property in Greece
and took the form of frequent bombings and threats of kid-
napping or death towards American diplomats who cooperated
with the government in power.
American officials' automobiles and downtown build-
ings were favorite targets of bombings that hoped to
persuade the United States to take a tougher stand against
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the government. In addition to these efforts, attempts
were made to discourage tourism through the bombing of
52Olympic Airways' Athens terminal.
Towards the end of the year, internal control was
relaxed somewhat through the restoration of rights of
association and assembly, and guarantees of the inviola-
bility of private homes. Press restrictions were eased
and jurist committees established to draft legislation
for full implementation of the new constitution.
1969 witnessed the Greek government's most serious
external challenge to its continued existence. The
opposition to the regime came from formal European or-
ganizations, American political personalities and the
last serious attempt by the most "acceptable" Greek
political figure to return to power.
Strong opposition to the Greek regime was voiced
through the Council of Europe during the year. Under
the Council's European Commission for Human Rights, a
report was issued charging the Greek government allowed
torture of political prisoners and denied human rights
through martial law. J The committee's report was is-
^ Schwab, Greece Under the junta
,
pages 78-82.
A summary of the findings of the Commission, the
published "Opinion of the Commission" and other related





sued as a result of a two-year investigation (the committee
also charged the government with obstructing their inves-
tigation by not allowing free access to prisoners or
prison facilities) and was released prior to the Council's
formal meeting in December. Greek representatives dis-
avowed the contents of the report, insisted that martial
law was necessary to maintain directed development towards
democracy and "resisting external interference in Greek
affairs" withdrew from the Council on December 13th, rather
than face probable expulsion. *"
Prior to these events, the NATO Political Committee,
headed by Senator Javits, had approved a resolution urg-
ing, members to pressure the Greek government to restore
parliamentary democracy, free elections and rule of law.^
American administration criticism of the Greek regime
was evidenced by a partial arms shipment suspension. In
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
by Secretaries Rogers and Laird, and by Assistant Secre-
tary of State Sisco before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, the suspension was formally acknowledged and
stated that the freeze would continue until progress was
made toward more democratic procedures and constitutional
New York Times
, December 13> page 1,
^ New York Times, October 17, page 9.
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government. Senate opposition to aid for Greece was
led by Senators Pell, M°ss, Javits,and Goodell and con-
sisted of, in addition to verbal statements, delaying
the confirmation of the new American Ambassador to Greece,
Henry J. Tasca; an attempt by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee to ban military grants to Greece and failing in
obtaining support for that measure, a Senate approved
resolution urging the Nixon Administration to make "all
possible efforts" to persuade the Greek government to
^7
restore constitutional government.
Both internal and external Greek political opposi-
tion to the Papadopoulos administration received a con-
siderable boost when Constantino Karamanlis broke a two-
year period of silence and spoke out forcefully from
Paris. Karamanlis urged the Greek military forces to
help overthrow the "tyrannical" regime and offered to
lead an interim government that would reform the con-
stitution and prepare for free elections.
Karamanlis' position was widely approved by "moderate"
Greek politicians and the event was viewed as possibly
providing the needed impetus for unifying Greek opposition
^ The Greek Observer
,
July 1969, pages 17-18.
^7
^' New York Times
,
December 13, page 3.
The complete text of Karamanlis' statement is in-
cluded in Maurice Genevoix, The Greece of Karamanlis (Lon-
don, 1973) pages 198-202.
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to Papadopoulos' government. Hopes for rapid unification
and quick action were immediately dissipated as factions
of the Greek spectrum made their reservations known con-
cerning methods for the overthrow and the form and sub-
stance of the interim government.
By the end of the year it appeared that Greece was
becoming progressively isolated from her European allies,
and the possibility of Greek expulsion from NATO was fre-
quently discussed in western political circles.
1970 :
The third year of rule by the "Greek Colonels" wit-
nessed continued internal stabilization, and perhaps a
greater realization by external opponents that it would
take more than verbal attacks to cause the removal of
the Papadopoulos government.
Internally, the year provided the last of the "large-
scale" political trials in which 3l| alleged members of
the "Democratic Defense" were accused and convicted of
sedition in plotting to overthrow the government through
violence (bombings, etc.). Defendents withdrew earlier
confessions of guilt charging that they were obtained
through torture or coercion and although all were con-
victed, generally lighter sentences were given those re-

in
quested by the government prosecuters. '
In October, the Greek Premier called for elections
in late November for a 56-member "Consultative Committee
on Legislation." Ninety- two candidates were to be selec-
ted by regional, professional and labor organizations.
One-half of these candidates were to be chosen for mem-
bership in the committee by Papadopoulos and the remain-
ing ten members appointed directly by the government.
In December the regime further emphasized their confi-
dence in their position by announcing the release of
305 political prisoners, this action combined with ear-
lier releases in the year reduced government estimates
of .political prisoners held to approximately 300. How-
ever, Papadopoulos also announced that political free-
doms denied by martial law since 1967 would not be re-
stored during 1971, thereby further reducing American
hopes for an imminent return to democratic procedures.
Internationally, the primary focus of events gen-
erally concerned American relations with the government
and in particular an increase in Executive/congressional
antagonisms over the conduct of foreign relations and in-
^ 9 New York Times , March 28, page 3; March 29, page
3; and April 13, page "l.
New York Times
,




ternal congressional debate over the proper way to lead
Greece back to democracy.
Congressional disagreements with the Nixon adminis-
tration were emphasized through administration renewals
of naval vessels on loan to Greece and through the dis-
closure that supplies of surplus military equipment,
above levels authorized by Congress, had been delivered
despite the limited arms embargo. During these dis-
cussions, administration sources revealed apprehension
over the rise of Soviet naval presence in the Eastern
Mediterranean and displayed an increased propensity to-
wards lifting the embargo. After the Senate's rejec-
tion of an amendment to the military sales bill that
would ban further arms shipments to Greece, Defense
Department contacts with Papadopoulos took place, and in
September the State Department announced the resumption
of full arms shipments valued at $56 million. -* Rela-
tions were further highlighted by the visit of Secretary
Laird and Admiral Moorer to Athens in October.
American policy was further defined by Secretary
Laird's statement that the modernization of Greece's
New York Times, March 16, page 2 and April 17,
page 1.
62 New York Times
,
July 1, page 6.
New York Times, September 23, page I4..
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armed forces had high priority in efforts to strengthen
the Atlantic Alliance, and it would be better that commit-
ments be met by Greece rather than increases in American
military personnel. ^
Non-American opposition during the year was provided
organizationally by the Council of Europe's Ministerial
Committee's resolution, and individually through the ef-
forts of Mikis Theodorakis, who was unexpectedly released
and allowed to emigrate during the spring.
Theodorakis, after his arrival in Paris, called for
the overthrow of the "creature of American imperialism"
through the formation of a national council of resis-
tance. "* A resolution of the Council of Europe made
public the 1969 European Human Rights Commission report
and called for the Greek government to abolish torture
and ill treatment, restore fundamental freedoms and re-
lease political prisoners.
By and large, the Papadopoulos government appeared
to be firmly in control and confident of its internal
position at the end of 1970. They had apparently over-
come what was considered to be their most crucial test
in at least winning the United States' financial and
^ New York Times
,
October 6, page 13.
New York Times, April 30, page 13.

military support and accepting that moral support of their
non-democratic characteristics would not be forthcoming.
In their view the United States needed Greece for NATO
defense requirements, and it appeared that the Greek
form of government was of secondary consideration.
1971 :
Events concerning American/Greek relations during
the year were dominated by increased Congressional activ-
ity directed towards reducing or eliminating aid to
Greece and the events surrounding the visits to Greece
by Secretary of Commerce Stans and Vice President Agnew.
Other than the visits, the only domestic items of note
included policy statements of Premier Papadopoulos re-
garding goals of education, social justice and economic
development for his fifth year in power and the announced
reduction of martial law. In addition, an attempt was
made to free Panaghoulis that gained notoriety through
the participation of Lady Amalia Fleming, the widow of
Sir Alexander Fleming, the discoverer of penicillin.
Later in the year, Lady Fleming was stripped of her
Greek citizenship and forceably sent to London. The
visits of Vice President Agnew and Secretary Stans, al-
though separated by six months, evoked similar responses.
For a personal account of these events, see Amalia
Fleming, A Piece of Truth (Boston, 1973).

Both seemed to go beyond "official" administration levels
of support in their public utterances, and both were ac-
cepted by the Greek government as visible proof of Amer-
can acceptance of the Papadopoulos regime. On the Con-
gressional front, widely publicized hearings were held
by the House of Representatives' committee on Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Europe concerning "Greece, Spain,
and the Southern NATO Strategy." These hearings provided
a forum for both supporters and opponents to the Greek
government, including spokesmen for the leading resis-
tance movements, both Greek and American. Combined with
Secretary Rogers' foreign policy statement in March, the
hearings provided the clearest enunciation of adminis-
tration policy and the major practicioner' s interpreta-
tion of that policy. These included Ambassador Tasca,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roger P. Davies and
Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand. Besides the
hearings, the committee also adopted an amendment to the
military aid bill which restricted aid to Greece and was
later approved by an eight vote margin on the floor of
the House. Both the House and Senate's adopted version
of the amendment contained en escape clause that could
be utilized by the President if he deemed it in the over-
riding interests of the nation.
67
' New York Times, August l±, page 1.

In European diplomatic events, at a private session
of the Political Committee of the Council of Europe,
Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand was quoted as having
S8id that the United States is disappointed over Greece's
internal policies but regards the regime as the lesser
of two evils. Secretary Hillenbrand objected to dis-
tortion of his comments by the press and received the
apologies of the Council's president who expressed his
distress of reports appearing in the press concerning
parts of confidential exchanges of views and held that
such reports quoted incompletely and out of context,
misrepresent facts.
During the year Ambassador Tasca seemed to increase
hi*s diplomatic contacts with those Greek leaders cur-
rently out of power; however, he denied that this sig-
nalled a change in administration policy. His meetings
included a courtesy call on the deposed monarch, the
first since Ambassador Tasca' s arrival in Athens in
January of 1970, eighteen months earlier, and a meeting
with Karamanlis in Paris.
1972 ;
Domestically, the fifth year of rule by the Papa-
dopoulos government featured further consolidation of
Aft
New York Times
, May 19, page ]+.
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the Premier's power through his assumption of the regency,
after dismissing and retiring General Zoitakis, and through
minor reorganization that placed additional close asso-
ciates in influential positions.
Although it appeared that Papadopoulos was now in his
most secure position since he assumed power, increasing
student agitation and the reappearance of student strikes
indicated serious opposition was still present within
Greece. These elements were acknowledged during his
annual message to the Greek people in which he stressed
that economic advances that had been achieved would be
wiped out if politicians were in power and "subversives"
were not restrained by martial law.
Diplomatically, Greece's horizons were broadened
through the arrival of French Undersecretary for Foreign
Affairs Jean deLipkowski, the first westerner (other than
American) of ministerial rank to visit since 1967, and
through the establishment of diplomatic relations with
Communist China.
Greece received an additional boost through the of-
ficial visit of Secretary of State Rogers on the l\.th of
July. Although Rogers noted differences between American
and Greek governments, he made it clear that the United
New York Times, December 2l\. t page 13.

State3 would strengthen military ties with Greece in spite
of criticism of the Greek government's suppression of
70democracy. Later in the year this position was further
strengthened by Rogers' speech before the American-
Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association in
Atlanta when he stated that it would not be in the best
interests of the United States to try and coerce Greece
into changing its form of government and that other
countries' choice of government "must in the final analy-
71
sis be what their people want or will permit."
Although Rogers' visit and statements normally
would have evoked strong opposition from anti-Papadopoulos
forces, the level of criticism was further intensified by
domestic American election year politics. Concern for
the Greek situation, was highlighted by the adoption of
a plank in the Democratic Party Platform calling for an
end to support of the Greek military government, and the
release of a letter by Senator McGovern to a resistance
leader stating that he would halt all aid to Greece with-
70 New York Times
,
July 6, page 3.
71 New York Times, August 25, page 3.
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72in ten days of his inauguration.
'
Two additional events complete Greek/American rela-
tions for the year: the announced waiver by the president
of the previously-mentioned ban on military aid and the
United States Navy's proposal to "homeport" units of the
Sixth Fleet in Greece with the resultant Congressional
hearings regarding this proposal.
Prior to the President's departure for China, the
formal notice to the Congress was signed, and the State
Department announced that President Nixon had decided
that overriding interests of national security required
he waive the Congressional ban on military aid to Greece.
The State Department also announced that approximately
$?0 million in arms, consisting of tanks, F-lj. Phantom
aircraft and ground equipment would be sold to Greece
before June 30th. This action evoked intensive criti-
cism by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on the
Near East who charged the actions were linked to nego-
tiations currently in progress for arrangements to home-
7-5
port ships of the Sixth Fleet in Athens. 1 -'
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' For transcripts of the letters involved in this
event, see the House of Representatives Joint Subcommittees
on Europe and the Near East, Hearings on the Political and
Strategic Implications of Homeoorting in Greece (here-
after referred to as Hearings: Homeporting ) , (U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1972), page 2^9.
73[J New Yprk Times, March 1|, page 1.
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Hearings were held during March and April on the pro-
posal, and a committee report issued in December severely
criticized the Defense and State Departments for selecting
Greece as one of the overseas sites and questioned the
political validity of the homeporting concept itself. ^
1973 :
Greek domestic politics dominates any discussion of
the events of this year, for it was during the period
that events appeared to outdistance any coherent political
plans and culminated in a military coup that seemingly
had as its primary goal the braking of the runaway "Greek
State Express."
The major events of this evolution included an at-
tempted naval coup, the abolition of the Greek monarchy,
an unopposed plebiscite establishing Papadopoulos as
President of the Greek Republic, extensive granting of
amnesty to opponents held as political prisoners, removal
of Papadopoulos' junta associates from power and replace-
ment by a civilian cabinet, student/worker violent demon-
strations, armored suppression of the demonstrators and
martial law reestablished in Athens. One week later, on
November 25 a military coup was successfully executed.
^ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, The Decision to Homeport in Greece, A
Report with Minority and Additional Views^ (TH S. Govern-
ment printing Office, 1972).
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The beginning of 1973 witnessed the continuation of the
student strikes of the previous year, and although the
police forcibly removed demonstrators from occupied
buildings on one occasion, the strikes were ended by
negotiations between student spokesmen and university
officials, a process that one year earlier probably
would not have been considered by government authori-
ties. On May 2\\., the Greek government announced that
they had stopped an attempt by a group of naval officers
to overthrow the government. Statements linked politi-
cians abroad with instigating the plot and challenged
Constantine to disown the unsuccessful attempt. Two
days later, in an associated event, the commanding offi-
cer of the Greek destroyer "Velos" requested and received
political asylum from Italy for himself and 30 officers
who had joined him in mutiny against the Greek govern-
ment. Events were analyzed as part of a plot to over-
throw Papadopoulos and return the monarch to Greece. "Ihe
leaders of this attempt reportedly included two retired
flag officers and approximately 35 senior officers. The
plot was discovered before the involved ships could de-
part from ports, except for the !, Ve los, n who was partici-
pating in NATO exercises at the time. On the day after
New York Times, May 25, page 3
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the Velos mutiny, the Athens newspapers reported that the
regime had now decided to hold a referendum to determine
the future of the exiled King and asserted the King's
silence over the naval affairs was sufficient proof that
he had blessed the abortive coup.
'
On June 1, the last tie of the Greek government with
the pre-coup situation of 1967 was severed with the an-
nounced abolition of the Greek monarchy by Premier Papa-
dopoulos. Declaring Greece a "presidential parliamentary
republic," the Premier announced a referendum would be
held in July to approve these actions and general elec-
tions would be held before the end of the year. In an-
nouncing the abolition, Papadopoulos attacked Constantine
for his "immature" actions in collaborating with reaction-
aries and asserted he was active in conspiratorial and
seditious activities including the recent mutiny of the
Greek Navy. Papadopoulos appointed himself "Provisional
77President of the Republic" and also continued as Premier.
No immediate statement was forthcoming from the State
Department, but press secretary Hare related that the United
7ft
States position "remains unchanged." Senator Pulbright
' New York Times , May 28, page 1.
77 New York Times , June 2, page 1.
' New York Times, June 2, page 10.
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requested Secretary Rogers take the opportunity of the
abolition to review policy towards Greece. Later the
State Department's position was "that due to Constantine'
s
exile since December of 1967, abolition of the monarchy
really did not alter the actual situation in Greece and
reiterated Secretary Rogers' recent statement that the
evolution of the political system is an "internal affair
of the Greek people in which the United States cannot
79
appropriately intrude."'
Constantine issued a statement on June 2 that he was
now ready to fight; he called on the armed forces and the
Greek people to reestablish their sovereign rights and
proposed the lifting of martial law and granting of am-
nesty as well as freedom of the press after the success-
ful overthrow of Papadopoulos. Greek language versions
of the statement were broadcast to Greece by Great Britain,
West Germany and other European nations. Although the
police in Athens were placed on special alert, the re-
mainder of the Athenians were unaffected, and the city
remained calm.
The referendum was held on July 29 with Papadopoulos
as the sole candidate for President and the decision on
the abolition of the monarchy to be decided by a vote for
79 New York Times, June 2, page 10 and June 3, page 3-

or against Papadopoulos. Pinal results showing pro-govern-
ment vote of 78$ were accompanied by loud charges of fraud
and voter intimidation. The referendum granted Papadopou-
los the presidency until 198l and gave him vast powers
over issues of foreign policy, national security and pub-
lic order. Initial analyses of the vote revealed that
the central Athens area voted G0% against Papadopoulas,
while the rural areas were overwhelmingly for the govern-
ment of the Premier/President.
On August 19, George Papadopoulos took the oath of
office as the first Greek President. in a nationwide
broadcast after the ceremony, Papadopoulos surprised ob-
servers, especially opposition critics, by announcing a
broad amnesty for all political crimes committed against
the government since 1967. He abolished martial law,
announced that a political cabinet free of junta members
would be created in October, political parties would be
authorized to operate in September, and a freely-elected
parliament would be established in 197^4-. In addition, he
announced he would pardon Panaghoulis, who had tried to
assassinate him in 1968. Within the next two days, de-
crees were signed implementing the above and approximately
330 prisoners were released, including civilians and naval
An
"New York Times, July 31, page 10.
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officers involved in the abortive coup and the mutinies
earlier in the year.
In the United States, Secretary Rogers welcomed the
news from Athens and stated that the "United States has
consistently urged the Greek government to return to a
political system that guarantees civil liberties and in-
O-i
sures the participation of the Greek people."
On October 6, the military junta was dismantled and
on October 8, Spyros Markezinis was sworn in as premier
of the first all-civilian cabinet since 196?. Markezinis'
main tasks were to reestablish contacts with leading po-
litical opponents in Greece in order to arrange for effec-
tive parliamentary election participation by the Greek
political spectrum.
The month of November brought an end to the drama of
the previous six and one-half years. Police and demon-
strators clashed following a memorial service for former
Center Union Prime Minister George Papandreou on November
if. With police absent from the ceremony, chants of "death
to the tyrants," "unite," and "down with Papadopoulos"
were tak en up, and thousands of demonstrators marched to
the center of Athens, initially overwhelming police re-
sistance and then breaking into smaller groups when police
reinforcements arrived. Violence erupted with demonstra-
D-i
New York Times, August 21, page 3.
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tors throwing stones and police wielding clubs.
On November 13, seventeen Greeks charged with rioting
were released after a trial in which excess police bru-
tality was charged. Twelve of the defendents were judged
not guilty and five others were sentenced but then re-
leased after appeal.
On the 15th, students again took to the streets
urging the overthrow of Papadopoulos, blocked traffic
in the center of the city and took over Athens Poly-
technic University. The police were reluctant to take
action against the students because of the criticism re-
ceived in handling the November I], demonstrations.
Crowds inside and adjacent to the campus were es-
timated at 10,000. The University Senate requested that
the government keep the police off the campus grounds,
and the government complied. The situation on the 16th
degenerated with continued street fighting beWeen demon-
strators and police. Statements of support from Kanel-
lopoulos and Mavros were received by student leaders who
earlier had called for a general strike. New dimensions
to the strike of the students were added with the appear-
ance of approximately 200 building construction workers
who were regarded by the government as the most militant
of the leftist groups in Greece.
With the fighting continuing into the night, shortly
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after midnight Greek army troops crashed through the gates
of Athens University and dispersed the student and worker
demonstration. Papadopoulos declared martial law in Ath-
ens; tanks withdrew from the city; students and workers
returned, set up barricades, overturned buses and the
police were again unable to maintain order. As a result,
the army tanks were called back, and the central area of
Athens was not under control until the l± p.m. curfew.
Scattered fighting continued on the l8th and the 19th,
By the 20th, general activities in Athens had returned to
normal, with the exception of the stringent security mea-
sures and the curfew imposed on the populace. Govern-
ment announcements stated that thirteen were killed dur-
ing the fighting and stressed that martial law require-
ments of soldiers and citizens must be obeyed. The
government also announced that approximately 2$0 people
were in prison on charges of sedition. On November 20,
Kanellopoulos, Mavros and Zigdis were placed under house
arrest for instigating the student revolts. Investiga-
tions continued into the causes, guidance and perpetra-
tion of the recent violence. By Friday, November 23, the
curfew had been reduced to the hours between one and five
a.m. and martial law relaxed. At five o'clock in the
morning on Sunday, November 25 > tanks and ships surrounded
a seaside villa 26 miles southeast of Athens. Inside,
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President George Papadopoulos was placed under house arrest
by army officers, thereby ending six years and seven months
of his control over the Greek government.
The leaders of the latest military coup appeared to
be from the more militant right-wing sector of the Greek
Army. Lieutenant General Phaedon Gizikis assumed the
Presidency and a civilian, Adamandio Androutsopoulos be-
came the new Premier. The key figure in the coup and
perhaps the most powerful in the new structure was Brig-




American Foreign Policy Formation
Most critics of American foreign policy since the
April coup have argued the primacy of the United States
in any efforts to return Greece to democratic govern-
ment. They claim that the Americans actually promoted
the coup through their opposition to the Center Union
and its leaders. This opposition precipitated the po-
litical crisis of 1965 and 1966 that encouraged a take-
over of some type (not necessarily the one that took
place the following year). Because most Greeks believe,
the argument continues, that the United States supports
the military government, popular resistance is minimized
and political opposition is necessarily ineffective. Any
peaceful challenge to the military regime from the civil-
ian sector requires American approval in order to succeed.
The argument asserts that the colonels could not remain
in power if the United States opposed them, therefore
repudiate the military junta, halt all aid, and the regime
will crumble.
The remainder of this study will focus on the influ-
ences and the issues involved that led two administrators,
one Democratic and one Republican, to adopt a policy other
ft o
For further development of this line of argument,
see the various testimonies of opposition leaders in
Hearings; Greece and Spain and Hearings: Homeporting .
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than the forceful actions suggested above.
Realizing that no clear definition can be made be-
tween influencing factors and accepting the dangers of
introducing a degree of artificiality by doing so, the
discussion will be broken into three categories: politi-
cal, military, and economic considerations. Further
references to "opposition" positions and proposals will
be included within each category.
Political Considerations
The clearest statement of American foreign policy in
regards to the Greek military government was provided by
Roger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs during an appearance
before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs on July 12, 1971. Secretary Davies
characterized the Greek situation in terms of a dilemma
in which .American policy has been to:
. . .protect our important security interests
there and in the broader area of the eastern
Mediterranean and Near East, while preserving
a working relationship with the regime through
which we can exert our influence to encourage
a return to representative government. 3
Restated, the dilemma is one that in order to secure
our national interests, we find ourselves allied, both
through NATO and bilateral agreements, to a government





whose political system is contrary to those principles
of democracy upon which the alliances were formed. The
question is twofold, how do we work with that govern-
ment when every contact is viewed as support of that
government's political form, and how do we "encourage"
that government back to an "acceptable" form without
alienating it and compromising our national interests
in the process?
The major political issues involved in Greek/Ameri-
can relations concern, first and foremost, the nature
of the military regime itself, its assumption of power,
and its relations with the United States through NATO
and bilateral agreements. In regards to the latter
issue, the military junta reaffirmed its military commit-
ments to NATO and confirmed that it would honor its bi-
lateral agreements with the United States. Recognition
of the government after the coup was not considered
necessary because representatives were accredited to
the monarchy rather than to individual governments. This
policy continued through Constantine ' s departure into
exile in December of 1967 as a regency was established
to reign in his absence. Y/hen Greece became a republic
in 1973> recognition no longer was considered an issue
because the monarch had been in exile for almost six years,
and the personnel of the republic were for the most part

62
the same as those who ruled under the monarchy. ^
It is on the nature of the assumption to power and
the subseouent rule of the military government that the
majority of controversy is centered. Most critics as-
sert that the conditions present in the Greek political
arena immediately prior to the coup, while seemingly un-
stable and characterized by some excesses, was fairly
close to "normal" for Greek politics and certainly not
a prelude to a communist takeover as claimed by the mili-
tary. ^ The Greek military government, on the other hand,
emphasizes the violence in the streets as indicative signs
of leftist efforts to assert their influence and viewed
the. events occurring in parliament as symptomatic of a
complete breakdown of order. The military viewed the
scheduled May elections capable of producing two results,
an outright victory by the Center Union whose left wing
would align itself with the "communist front" EDA, there-
by giving the government a strong leftist base, or a close
electoral battle in which the EDA would hold the balance
and align with the leftist leaning Center Union. In either
case, their interests would not be furthered. There was
a possibility of an ERE victory, but both the military's
^. New York Times , June 3> Page 3«






and the crown's patience had wore thin with the demOCra-
tic process as practiced in the "cradle of democracy."
American objections to the Greek regime primarily
concern the restrictions of individual freedoms through
the continuance of martial law. As soon as the colonels
had seized power, martial law was proclaimed and Greece
was considered to be in a state of seige which further
restricted the rights of individuals. Large-scale ar-
rests were directed against leftist elements, but also
included moderate political leaders. Estimates vary in
the numbers involved during the first few months but
generally they fall between 2,000 and 6,500. Many of
these were released after initial processing. The junta
justified the imposition of martial law through analogies
of Greece being a "sick" patient as well as the necessity
to restrain subversive segments of Greek society.
During this initial phase of rule, the United States
adopted a "wait and see" attitude, while expressing con-
cern over the fate of political prisoners and temporarily
suspending some heavy equipment in the pipeline to Greece,
Although the colonels indicated when they assumed
power that it was not their intention to perpetuate their
rule, return to democratic government was to prove to be
D Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 358-361
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a protracted process. It appeared, by 1968, that the pro-
cess may have begun in earnest and perhaps the United
States' gentle persuasion was producing some concrete
results.
It was the military's avowed purpose to rebuild the
Greek democratic system, and the first step in this pro-
cess was the drafting of a new constitution and its sub-
A"7
mission to plebiscite. The drafting of the constitu-
tion by the junta and its submission while the nation
was still under martial law, and therefore open to ques-
tions of validity, was loudly criticized by opposition
forces. However, the performance of this function by
the military has more than adequate precedent in modern
Greek history, as the first three constitutions were pro-
QO
vided as results of military coups.
While the constitution was drafted and approved, por-
tions relating to elections, political parties and indi-
vidual rights were still suspended and awaited implemen-
ting legislation. Some of the restrictions on personal
freedoms were eased, censorship relaxed somewhat and some
political prisoners were released during 1969 and 1970.
' For a description of the main features of the 1968
Constitution, see the earlier chronology of the events of
1968.
DO
Hearings; Greece and Spain, page i|05.
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While criticism continued over the delay in the restora-
tion process and doubts were raised concerning the govern-
ment's true intentions, the main emphasis shifted to the
question of torture.
The Greek government, particularly the internal se-
curity police and the army were charged with using tor-
ture as an accepted administrative process in extracting
confessions from political prisoners, with the appear-
ance of an article in Look magazine in May of 1969 and
the earlier publication of a report by Amnesty Interna-
tional regarding torture in Greece, the Greek situation
and the American policy toward her became a more frequent
subject of discussion and debates within the Congress of
the United States.
By the end of 1970, it appeared that some progress
had been made in this transition process; however, Prime
Minister Papadopoulos announced in December that in 1971,
no further political steps would be taken towards elec-
tions. This statement prompted Secretary of State Rogers
and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco to express their
disappointment that the Greek government had not done more
90in its movement to restore representative democracy.
89 Wren, "Greece: Government by Torture," Look
, May
27, 1969, pages 19-21.
90 Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 37-38.
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Although disappointement was expressed, official United
States policy remained the same.
While American policy never "officially" changed,
the Nixon administration accepted that the transition
would be a long process whose timetable would be set by
91those in power in Greece. The government continued to
urge Papadopoulos along the road to democracy by applaud-
ing democratic reforms and loosening of restrictions with-
in Greece. As pointed out in the chronology, this period
was highlighted by visits of high ranking civilian govern-
ment officials inaugurated with Secretary Laird and fol-
lowed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, Vice Presi-
dent Agnew, Secretary of Commerce Stans and concluded
with Secretary Rogers.
The position of the American Ambassador in Greece has
been significant not only as providing the visible link
in relations between the two states, but also in this in-
stance his conduct in displaying support or opposition
to the regime end his reporting of internal conditions
within Greece. In particular, his assessment and report-
ing to the State Department the degree of support the
military regime voluntarily receives from the populace,
91 See testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of





is of significant importance in determining American
policy.
Ambassador Phillips Talbot, criticized for his lack
of intervention during the pre-coup political crisis, as
compared to earlier criticisms of excessive intervention
by his predecessors, was active in urging restraint im-
mediately after the coup and perhaps was instrumental in
preventing excesses of the summary execution variety.
Ambassador Henry Tasca has had considerable influ-
ence in determining American policy. The nine-month
delay in naming a successor to Ambassador Talbot was
widely interpreted as an indication of American dis-
approval of the Greek government and an attempt to speed
up the process of returning to democracy. Although the
State Department did not confirm the intent, it did ad-
92
mit that the nomination was being delayed. However,
once Ambassador Tasca assumed his post, Greek/American
relations began to improve. Although reports of Ambas-
sador Tasca are not available for analysis, and his
testimony before congressional bodies is extremely cen-
sored, it can be inferred from available statements that
he strongly supported returning to normal relations be-
ep7 New York Times, August 12, 1969, page
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93tween the two states. J Within a year of his confirma-
tion, the military aid embargo was lifted, aid resumed,
and the earlier-mentioned series of visits began.
The role of Congress has been twofold in determining
policy. First of all in advising the administration
through debates, comments on the floor and through its
committee hearing system, and secondly, through its con-
trol over appropriations. The Congress has been effec-
tive in providing a forum for both pro and ant i- junta
viewpoints, and it has been fairly evenly divided over
the Greek issue. Those measures that have been adopted
to express opposition to the government of George Papa-
dopoulos have been also designed to allow the adminis-
tration to override congressional action if deened
necessary.
Strong opposition from members of the Senate Coramitte<
on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and demands for a "hard-line" have proven to be
largely ineffectual in altering administration policy re-
garding political and military relations with Greece.
As previously mentioned, Congress has provided an
effective forum for both sides to the Greek question, as
witnessed by numerous transcriptions and frequent inser-
Q-5
Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 303-322.
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tions into the Congressional Record, as well as the hear-
ings by committees of the House and Senate cited earlier.
Besides periodic hearings regarding foreign aid and mili-
tary assistance, specific hearings have been held by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 1970 concern-
ing "United States Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad, Greece and Turkey" and by the House Foreign Af-
fairs Subcommittees in July, August and September of 1971
regarding "Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy"
and in March and April of 1972 concerning "Political and
Strategic Implications of Homeporting in Greece." These
hearings will be discussed further in the section on mili-
tary considerations. in addition to the above, the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittees issued a report on the Home-
porting decision, and the Senate issued a staff report on
the situation in "Greece: February 1971."
The latter report, completed by two staff members
who visited Greece for one week, was extremely critical
of the American Embassy's performance as well as that
of the State Department. In its concluding remarks the
report states that:
In the military sphere, it would aopear that our
declared policy objectives have been achieved. . . .
By contrast, the declared policy objectives in
the political sphere have not been achieved. The
"trend toward a constitutional order" is at best
ambiguous, and the confident predictions by Ameri-
can officials with regard to the reestablishment
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of parliamentary democracy have not been borne
out by events.
. . .The policy of friendly
persuasion has clearly failed. The regime
has accepted the friendship, and the military
assistance, but has ignored the persuasion.
Indeed, the regime seems to have been able to
exert more leverage on us with regard to mili-
tary assistance than we have been willing to
exert on the regime with regard to political
reform. we see no evidence that this will not
continue to be the case. 94
The acknowledged congressional leaders of the recent
opposition to the Greek government during this time frame
were Senators Claiborne Pell and J. W. Fulbright and Rep-
resentatives Donald Edwards and Donald M. Praser. Greek
opposition leaders in exile, while successful in gaining
exposure for their positions, also have been unsuccessful
in altering American policy. Varying considerably in
political philosophy, the more celebrated ones include,
Mikis Theodorakis, poet, composer, former deputy of the
EDA, and acknowledged leader of the Greek Communist Party;
Andreas Papandreou, Greek political leader mentioned fre-
quently in previous sections and currently Professor of
Economics at Toronto University; Melina Mercouri, actress
and her husband Jules Dassin; Helen Vlachos, former pub-
lisher and editor of Kathimerini , the leading Greek con-
servative daily; Constantine Karamanlis, former conserva-
9k^
U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Greece: February 1971 , a staff report, (U. S. Govern-
ment printing Office, 1971), pag© 16.
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tive Prime Minister and leader of the ERE; and the de-
posed monarch, King Gonstantine II. It is interesting
to note that of the above, both Karamanlis' and Constan-
tino's criticism of the colonels were generally restrained
and relatively infrequent up to the time of the abolition
of the monarchy, at which time Constantino broke his si-
lence and forcefully expressed his opposition to the
government in power. The obvious diversity of inter-
ests of the Greek leaders and the widespread political
positions have led to a severe lack of united efforts and
has considerably hampered the movement.
Military Considerations
It has been frequently asserted that the United States
has security interests of sufficient magnitude in the East-
ern Mediterranean that it wouldn' t make any difference
what kind of governments were in power in Greece and Tur-
key, the American government would try to maintain friend-
ly working relationships in order to secure these inter-
9^
ests. ^ Although perhaps overstated, a general overview
of Greece's position within NATO's strategic defense
structure and her role in contributing to the alliance,
may further explain the significance of Greece to the
NATO and American defense fabric.
9
'^ See Senate Hearings, Greece and Turkey for vary-
ing positions on this issue.
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Italy, Greece and Turkey provide what is commonly
referred to as the "Southern Plank" of NATO. Their posi-
tion within the alliance is to present a forward defense
against the advance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact countries into the Mediterranean, Middle East and
Africa, through maintaining control over the Turkish
Straits, the seas and the land masses contiguous to the
Straits, the Aegean and the Adriatic Seas. Strategists
believe that this can be accomplished through successive
defense lines available within the southern region and
can be successfully defended in the eventuality that
Central Europe is occupied and unable to provide assis-
96tance.
An analysis of the force levels immediately avail-
able in the southern region reveals that in land forces
and in air power, the Warsaw Pact nations (Bulgaria and
Romania) and the Soviet Union have a definite advantage
over NATO forces. In the case of the Soviet Union, only
those elements located within the southern and south-
western areas that would be available are considered.
The NATO calculations include American units that are
forward deployed such as tactical air units identified
96 For a good general analysis of the military stra-
tegy involved, see G. Mar-garitis, "Strategic Analysis of
the Eastern Mediterranean," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings
,
May 1973 > pages 112-1ZJ.7.
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for NATO operations. This numerical advantage, in men
as well as eauipment, is balanced by the naval superi-
or
ority of the "Southern Flank." ' It is in the recent
advances in the Soviet naval presence in the Eastern
Mediterranean that analysts see a threat to the main-
tenance of the balance.
Greece's geographic position is critical to the
Southern Plank. Centrally located, its loss would iso-
late the Eastern Mediterranean as well as exposing Italy's
and Turkey's flanks and granting additional access to
the Mediterranean.
Greece contributes to NATO combat force levels that
include twelve army divisions, eleven combat squadrons
of 225 total aircraft, and approximately A4J4. surface and
98
subsurface combatant and patrol vessels. In order to
maintain these forces, Greece devotes about I4. to $% of
her annual Gross National Product for defense, ranking
her fourth in NATO behind the United States, Portugal,
99
and Gre8t Britain. Due to the large NATO commitments,
it is necessary for Greece to retain a relatively large
percentage (8. 9^) of the men of eligible age in the regular
97 Ibid.
9 The Military Balance 1973-197lj- (London, 1973)
page 22.
99 Ibid., page 7^.
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armed forces. Greece has been largely dependent on Ameri-
can military aid and credits for equipment procurement
and modernization. Since the April coup, the United
States has provided Greece with approximately $130. ij.
million in grant aid and $221 million in credit sales
through fiscal year 197^. As a result of Greece's
modernization program and increased economic position,
the Greek government stated that she would no longer re-
quire military grants commencing with the 197^4- fiscal
year.
Critics have frequently charged that through the
granting or withholding of military aid to Greece, the
United States can pressure the Greek government into
making desired reforms. However, both the Johnson and
the Nixon administrations have stressed the necessity of
providing aid to Greece in order to maintain the effec-
tiveness of the NATO deterrent. Initial embargos of
heavy equipment were lifted after the Czechoslovakian
invasion in 1968, as it was recognized that the credi-
bility of the Greek forces had suffered as a result of
the equipment delays since the April coup. As Deputy
Figures derived from information provided by
U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, He arings
on Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act S. \i\l\3',
93^ Congress 1st Session, May 1973 (U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1973) psg© 95 and Hearings; Greece
and Spain, pages 212-213.
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Assistant Secretary Davies related:
We have come to recognize as a general propo-
sition that withholding military or economic
assistance is an ineffectual tactic in per-
suading foreign governments to move in di-
rections we consider desirable. When pres-
sures of this kind by this and other govern-
ments have been attempted, they generally
have not succeeded. 101
Irrespective of the material condition of the Greek
armed forces, their effectiveness has been questioned
due to the large number of forced and voluntary retire-
ments of general and flag officers after the April coup,
the King's counter coup, and the naval uprisings of 1973.
It can be deduced from the comments regarding Greek units'
performance in NATO military and naval exercises, that if
their force effectiveness has been reduced, it has not
102been apparent to military observers.
Another area of criticism regarding Greek/American
relations concerns the frequency of visits by high rank-
ing military personnel to Greece. Upon further analy-
sis, however, it can be shox^m that at the highest level
visits, almost all of these were of the courtesy type
associated with NATO command assumption or observation
Hearings; Greece and Sr>nin
,
page 27.
102 See remarks of General Andrew J. Goodpaster,
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe as auoted in Hearings:
Home porting
,
page 5> concerning status of Greek military
in 1969 and his most recent comments as reported in the
New York Tines, July llj., 1973, page 2lj..
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of NATO exercises held on Greek territory. * The large
majority of the other visits are routine visits of units
of the Sixth Fleet and have little if any protocol con-
tact with the leaders of the governmental apparatus.
The frequency of the visits of this type are fairly
stable and politically cause little impact.
In addition it should be pointed out that within
the Mediterranean there are only approximately seven
regularly visited ports that can absorb the numbers of
people involved by a visit of an aircraft carrier or a
carrier task force without severe problems; of these
seven, Greece has two or three, depending upon the time
of year, Athens, Corfu and Rhodes. ^ Greek ports are
considered extremely desirable liberty ports for Ameri-
can sailors; besides the attractions of a metropolitan
area and the advantages offered by Athens, Greek prices
compare favorably with Spanish and Italian ports and are
considerably less than those of the French Riviera.
Irregardless of the intentions or purposes of visits
by American military leaders, it can and has been viewed
as "de facto" approval of the Greek government. This
^ For a listing of military visits since 1967 to




^ Hearings: Homenorting, page XX.
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also is an issue concerning the Navy's decision to "home-
port" units of the Sixth Fleet in Athens. Homeporting
has been characterized by the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral E. R Zumwalt, Jr., as a largely administrative
decision made to uphold deployed force commitments and
improve retention during a period of declining numbers
of ships and excessive demands placed on naval personnel. -*
The plan involves the gradual forward deployment of two
carrier task forces, one homeported in Yokuska, Japan and
one in Athens, Greece and through this concept reducing
the frequency of long-term navy carrier deployments and
accompanying family separations. The concept would pro-
vide for dependents to reside in Athens, living "off of
the local economy," and stressed that no large-scale con-
struction was planned or necessary as the ships were not
being based in Greece, but would be using Athens as its
home port while deployed to the Sixth Fleet.
The Navy Department had conducted a series of brief-
ings for congressional representatives, and in March and
April of 1972, joint hearings were held before the Sub-
committee on Europe and the Near East of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs on the "Political and Strategic Implications







of Homeporting in Greece." In December the subcommittee
published a report on "The Decision to Homeport in Greece."
The report criticized the State and Defense Department's
decision and concluded that:
Homeporting in Greece today does a serious dis-
service to American relations with the Greek
people, to ties with our NATO allies and, most
importantly, to our own democratic traditions.
The subcommittees recognize that the United
States has legitimate military and security
interests in Greece relating both to NATO and
Middle East responsibilities. These interests
must be balanced, however, by appropriate con-
cern for the suspension of democratic govern-
ment in Greece since 1967. The homeporting
decision did not, we believe, properly reflect
that concern. . . .We consider the danger of
pre-eminence of military and strategic con-
siderations over political values a fundamen-
tal problem of American foreign policy decision-
. making today. 10 7
In contrast, the minority views stated that:
Obviously there is room for honest differences
of opinion regarding the basic concept of home-
porting, and also regarding our country's rela-
tionship with the present Greek government ....
the subcommittees' report. . . .actually ignores
the testimony developed during the hearings, and
comes to conclusions which cannot be supported
by the evidence. The result is more an airing
of a preconceived point of view than a critical
and objective examination of the issues. 1°°
Economic Considerations
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1 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, The Decision to Homeport in
Greece, A Report
, 9 2d Congress, Zd Session (U. S. Govorn-
ment printing Office, 1972), pages 1-2 (hereafter re-





As previously mentioned, American economic grant
aid to Greece was halted at the end of fiscal year 1962
as a result of Greece's improved economic position and
potential for continued stability. Some continuing
economic assistance has been provided through sales of
surplus agricultural products and Export-Import Bank
loans, although the amounts are relatively small in
109
comparison to earlier grants. 7 Greece continues to
maintain close economic ties with the United States,
but America's share of Greek import trade is declining
as Greece expands her association with the European
Community.
In general, Greece's economy during the late 1960s
and beyond has exhibited significant economic growth.
Since 1969 her rate of growth in Gross National Product
has ranged between 8.3$ and 10. 5$, while estimates for
1973 exceed 12$. It is because of Greece's rapidly
expanding economy that she is starting to experience
the phenomenon of inflationary pressures so prevalent
109 Hearings; Greece and Spain
,
page Ij.81.
For the most current statement of the Greek
economy, see U. S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Econ-
omic Trends and Their Implications for the United States ;
Greece (hereafter referred to as Economic Trends ), Octo-
ber 20, 1973-




in industrialized western societies. Other indicators
of Greece's rapid growth are contained in her rise in
per capita GNP from $698 in 1967 to $1,232 in 1972 while
112
the unemployment rate has dropped from 1 ,G% to 1.5/&.
Structurally the Greek economy has some serious de-
fects. A country in the process of development, Greece's
agricultural sector, while providing employment for al-
most $Ofo of the labor force and 60c,o of Greece's exports,
only provides 20$ of her GNP. industry employs about
2%% of the labor force while the service sector pro-
vides f>0% of the GNP and employs a smaller segment of
113the labor force. Greece's imports far exceed her ex-
ports, providing her with additional problems in trade
relations. For example, in 1972, Greek exports amounted
to $871 million while her imports totaled $2,ll|5 million. "
However, Greece's earnings from "invisibles," emigrant
and worker remittances, tourism and shipping, combined
with increasing capital inflows have prevented this im-




U. S. Department of Commerce, Overseas Business
Reports , "Basic Data on the Economy of Greece," Hay 1972,
^ Economic Trends, October 20, 1973.

81
It is in the areas of tourism and capital invest-
ment that the United States plays a major role in the
modern Greek economy. Due to Greece's association with
the Common Market, she provides a point of entry for the
United States through investment in Greece. •* By enact-
ment of favorable foreign investment laws, Greece has
encouraged investment, and American investors have respon-
ded to the degree that as of 1972, American capital in-
vestment in Greece totaled approximately $275 million
and represented almost 50% of all foreign capital in-
vestment allowed under Greek law. In addition, by
the end of 1970, there were $191 million in foreign
bank deposits in Greece, of this figure, $lljij. million
117
were from the United States. Through the first nine
months of 1973* the Greek government authorized $235
million in proposals for new foreign investment with the
l"1 8United States accounting for $I).l million of that total.
The largest American investment in Greece as of May 1972
was the Esso-Pappas petrochemical and steel complex val-
119
ued at approximately $166 million.
11 Economic Trends , October 20, 1973.
116 ibid.
'
117 Hearings; Greece and Spain
,
pages 31-32.
11 Economic Trends , October 20, 1973-
119 Hearings; Greece and Spain, page 31.
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Greece continues to provide one of the most desir-
able vacation areas for European and American tourists.
Tourism, in turn, provides one of the most important
sectors of the Greek economy. Tourist arrivals in 1970
numbered approximately 1,600,000 while the foreign ex-
change earnings from these visitors amounted to over
$190 million, of this amount Americans accounted for
120
over $109 million. Greek tourist arrivals increase
annually at a rate between 20 and 30 percent, while
total receipts have been rising at an even faster
pace. 121
120 Ibid., page 32.
121 For the Greek government's viewpoint of the
Greek economy, see The Revolution of 21st April Builds
a New Greec e, Greek Ministry of Coordination, Public
Relations Service (Athens, 1970).
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Foreign Policies Available to the United States
As has been mentioned in the preceding discussions,
any policy adopted by the United States has to consider
the political, the strategic military, and the economic
aspects of our relations with the Greek state. If it is
assumed that it is in our best interests to retain the
strategic advantages Greece provides, as well as to pro-
tect those American investments in the Greek economy,
our policy should be such that it minimizes the risks
of losing those advantages or jeopardizing those invest-
ments. However, if it is assumed that the military ad-
vantages are not of significant import or can be sepa-
rated from the political considerations, then the risk
factor is reduced to a considerable extent and a more
active or aggressive policy can then be pursued. An
assumption that accomplishes this "separation" or "neu-
tralization" of these factors is the frequently asserted
position that militarily and economically, Greece is al-
most entirely dependent upon the West and in particular,
the United States, and as a result, internal Greek for-
ces would never allow the Greek government to become com-
pletely alienated from the United States and seek military
122
support outside of the NATO framework.
122 See especially the testimony of T. A. Couloumbis
and E. P. Deme tracopoulos in Hearings; Greece and Spain
,
and G. Rallis in Hearings: Home porting.

In analyzing the merits of policies available to the
United States in her relations with the military govern-
ment of Greece, certain basic assumptions regarding the
Greek situation and the long range goals for Greece are
generally agreed upon by proponents of various courses
of action. These assumptions are: that Greece should re-
turn to representative government and democratic pro-
cesses; it is desirable that this return process be ac-
complished through political vice military means; and
the national interests of Greece and the United States
as well as those of the NATO alliance should be protec-
ted. Although there are those who would disagree as to
what these interests are, or should be, these goals for
the Greek state are generally accepted and differences
arise only in the proposed means to accomplish the end
product.
Of the three assumptions, the premise that Greece
should return to democratic processes is perhaps the most
commonly accepted. All parties concerned, including the
military government that frequently alludes to Greece's
return to democracy and characterizes itself as a "paren-
thesis in the political life of Greece," * accept that
the authoritarian state is to be replaced by a representa-





tive democracy based upon a constitution. Differences
occur when discussing the conditions and the individual
events in the process as well as the timing of the trans-
ition. An example can be seen in the disagreement over
the issue of the Greek Constitution. pro-governmental
sources favor the democratic process to be conducted
under the 1968 Constitution. Opposition forces take
the position that the new constitution was thrust upon
the Greek people under the pressures of martial law and
as such should be disallowed, and the previous constitu-
tion reinstated as the supreme law of the land.
Regarding the issue of the means by which Greece
will return to democratic process, the American point of
view, administration policy as well as those in opposi-
tion, favors a political solution to the Greek problem
rather than a military one which connotes an internal up-
rising and the overthrow of the present regime by dissi-
dent elements of the Greek military or a popular revolu-
tion. Either of these two military situations presupposes
bloodletting of varying degrees. Greek opposition to the
current military government by and large also favors a
political solution. Frequently, however, warnings are
voiced regarding the increasing probability of a military
solution as the democratization process as guided by the
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military government seems to falter and stall. ^ Of the
two military solutions, an internal coup seems to be pre-
ferable to the Greek leaders in exile rather than a popu-
lar uprising which would probably precipitate large-scale
bloodshed and possible civil war. Those who score the
likelihood of the latter occurring fall generally within
the ranks of the resistance leaders, both internal and
external, whose political ideology falls into the left
segments of the political spectrum. '
The political solution to the problem involves the
military government restoring normal political process,
i.e. formation and operation of political parties, the
abolition of martial law and the entire process culmina-
ting in general elections. It is in the timing of these
events, as well as in the degrees of political freedom
to be allowed during the transition, that the sharp dif-
ferences among Greek politicians themselves as well as
between themselves and the government in power can be
most clearly seen. The political leaders demand a rapid
reversion to democratic processes, while the government
reserves the right to establish its own time schedules




^ Two examples can be found in M. Theoradikis,
Journals of Resistance and in Margaret papandreou's
testimony in Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 169-181.
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while guiding this transition, rebuilding Greek democra-
tic institutions to their specifications, and altering
the timing as they feel that circumstances warrant.
Within the broad premise that Greek, American and
NATO interests should be protected, the greatest dis-
parity occurs in attempting to define what those inter-
ests are. It is frequently and accurately stated that
militarily Greece and the United States receive signi-
ficant benefits from their bilateral relations, the
United States through its use of bases and facilities
located on Greek soil, and Greece from American military
aid in training Greek forces, as well as in its receipt
of .equipment and technology. Within the NATO alliance
framework, strategic benefits are realized through Greece's
contributions of men and material to the alliance fabric
and geographically through her strategic location. Any
evaluation as to who benefits more from the association
would be largely subjective and exceedingly difficult to
quantify in a reasonable manner with changing scenarios.
The main Question raised in a discussion of zhe rela-
tionships between the United States and Greece, and be-
tween these states and other member NATO nations, is the
issue of Greece's participation in fin alliance whose
main goal is the protection of the democratic way of life,




Although no official attempt has been made to exclude
Greece from the Atlantic Alliance, most member nations
have expressed concern over the lack of democratic free-
doms and have urged the Greek government to return to
representative government. Within this body, Denmark
and Norway have been the most vocal in their opposition
to the Greek regime and to the United States' position
and manner of dealing with the military government.
For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that
given the first two goals of the return of democratic
processes to Greece, and its accomplishment through
political means, the United States, Greece and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization consider it to be
within their best interests to retain close, friendly
working relations.
In general, the United States has two basic foreign
policies it can adopt toward the military government of
Greece. Policies that can best be described as "hard-
line" position and a "soft-line" policy. Although there
are varying degrees of hardness and softness, which will
be discussed later, the basic "hard-line" position asserts
1 oa
See earlier cited recommendation of the Council
of Europe in chronology covering 1970 and Hearings;
Greece and Spain, pages 59-60, 31l±, and 3,26-329.
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that the Greek military government assumed power through
extraconstitutional and therefore illegal means, it holds
its citizens in a police state against their will, and
the United States as the leader of the free, democratic
world has an obligation to take the lead in opposing the
regime. The United States should revoke all ties with
this government until democracy is restored in Greece.
This view advocates the expulsion of Greece from NATO,
encourages American support of resistance groups with-
in and external to Greece, and calls for the withholding
of all economic and military aid. This policy emphasizes
America's "moral obligation" to take positive steps (short
of direct military or subversive intervention) to aid in
127the overthrow of the military junta.
The basic "soft-line" policy accepts the fact that
the government in power, irregardless of its method of
assuming nower, is the established government of Greece,
and because of predominant security considerations, it
is in our best interests to maintain close working rela-
tionships with the Greek state. Although we do not a-
gree with the form of government and abhor excesses con-
127
' This position can be applied in varying degrees
to the testimony given in the two hearings as well as
the public statements of such individuals as Representa-
tives Edwards, Praser and Brademas, Senators Pulbright,
Pell, Jackson and Javits, as well as the previously
mentioned Greek opposition leaders.
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earning individual rights, we can best facilitate Greece's
return to representative government through working with
the present leaders and assisting them along the road to
democracy by persuasion and encouragement. With varying
degrees this "soft-line" policy can be associated with
both the Johnson and Nixon administrations' dealings with
Greece since 1967.
In the case of the "hard-line" policy, the emphasis
is placed upon the United States taking direct actions
that will demonstrate clearly to all concerned that we
are in opposition to the military government of Greece.
Through these actions, both the Greek government and the
Greek people will know that the military government does
not have the backing of the United States and, presup-
posing the lack of a broad popular internal base, the
only course of action available to the military govern-
ment is to turn power over to a non-political interim
government. This government will then arrange for nation-
wide general elections through which the Greek people will
express their desires. This policy emphasizes the premise
that the power of the regime is based on two pillars, the
support provided by the Greek Armed Forces and the belief
by the Greek populace that the United States backs the
military government. Once the United States ceases to
actively support the colonels, the Greek military will
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follow the same course. Consequently, if the government
did not voluntarily relinquish power, it would be seized
by pro-American military segments. In addition, this
policy also accepts the premise that Greece will remain,
under almost all eventualities, aligned to the West and
will not attempt to take a neutralist position in the
Cold War.
The actions that can be taken by the United States
within this policy framework provide for the previously-
mentioned degrees of hardness. These actions have, by
and large, been proposed, with varying degrees of em-
phasis and combination, by opponents of the policies of
the Nixon and Johnson administrations. The most commonly
cited actions include encouraging the expulsion of Greece
from NATO; reducing or terminating all military aid to
Greece; strong statements of American opposition to the
Greek government, while reaffirming our close friendship
to the Greek people in general; maintaining our military
presence but reducing the level of our contacts, e.g. re-
ducing the JUSMAAG commander billet from Major General to
Colonel; stopping all courtesy visits of high ranking
American government and military officials; and increas-
ing support of anti- junta opposition groups and individual
leaders from the pre-coup political scene.
Advocates of this policy, while disagreeing on the
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appropriateness of individual measures, agree on the pri-
macy of the role of the United States and the need for
some type of "affirmative action" by the American govern-
ment. While admitting that circumstances could develop
that even the execution of a hard-line policy may not
bring about the rapid return of Greece to the democratic
fold, the United States at least will have fulfilled its
moral responsibilities to the principles of democracy
and the Greek people themselves through its demonstrated
opposition to authoritarian rule.
As previously mentioned, the "soft-line" policy em-
phasizes the primacy of maintaining the strategic mili-
tary benefits realized through our association with the
Greek state. In particular, this policy points to
Greece's location in proximity to potential world trouble
spots and her contributions to NATO's "Southern Plank"
as being of overriding importance in Greek/American re-
lations, in addition, this viewpoint accepts the neces-
sity of Greece's return to democratic processes but em-
phasizes the United States does not have the ability to
force change on the Greek government and asserts that
-I aO
our influence over Greek political developments is marginal.
Hearings; Greece and Spain, page i+0.
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"Soft-liners" generally attempt to separate the mili-
tary issues from the political ones. That is to say, it
is asserted that it is in the best interests of all par-
ties concerned to have the Greek military in a high state
of readiness to enable it to efficiently carry out its
NATO functions. To accomplish this, American aid is
required and any disagreements over the form or policies
of the Greek government should not affect the amount and
type of aid given to the Greek military. Therefore, in
the Greek case, it is not appropriate to use military
aid for political purposes. Besides the inappropriate -
ness of withholding military aid in an attempt to force
political change, advocates of the 'soft-line" policy
stress that Greeks of aJI strata would react unfavorably
to attempts of this type, thereby raising anti-American
sentiments and perhaps encouraging those elements who
would have Greece take a more independent or neutralist
stand vis a' vis the West.
Greek supporters of the military regime often criti-
cize the emotion attached to the Greek question. These
supporters focus attention on the pre-coup political
situation, characterize it as corrupt, chaotic, and in-
viting to attempts at a communist takeover. They point
to the numerous governments that have held power since
World War II as further proof of the instability of Greek
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political life. In their view, the April coup did not
overthrow a viable democratic system but rather saved
Greece from complete disaster. While not necessarily
agreeing with some of the methods employed by the govern-
ment, they do agree with the long-range goals of the
government in power and the necessity of restructuring
129the parliamentary system.
Both Greek and American advocates of this type of
policy assume that the only way Greece can peacefully
return to a representative system of government is through
the consent and collaboration of those individuals cur-
rently in power and therefore stress the necessity of
maintaining close working relations with them and en-
couraging their democratization efforts.
Actions to be taken in support of a "soft-line"
policy towards Greece would include: the maintenance of
required levels of military aid; maintaining "normal"
diplomatic, civilian and military contacts with the
Greek government; application of pressure limited to
private diplomatic exchanges; public praise and en-
couragement given to positive efforts taken along the
129 See testimony of D. G. Kousoulas in Hearings ;
Greece and Spain
,





^ See statement of Ambassador Henry J. Tasca in





road to democratic processes; and maintaining all avail-
able lines of communications between the two states.
Advocates of the "soft-line" policy refuse to attach
any time schedule to the transition process and consider
this element to be controllable only by the Greek state
and the Greek people themselves. The Greek domestic
situation is viewed as uncertain at best due to inabili-
ties in evaluating such factors as the degree of politi-
cal dissatisfaction or apathy present in the Greek popu-
lation, or the degree of popularity enjoyed by the mili-
tary government as a result of apparent economic gains




As can be seen from the preceding discussions, Ameri-
can relations with the Greek state since the April 21st
coup have, by and large, remained friendly while proving
to be extremely frustrating to a large segment of the
American political scene. After seven years of rule by
the colonels, Greece appears to be a long way from reali-
zing her return to democratic government. It must, how-
ever, be readily admitted that the situation in 197^- has
improved considerably from the early period of military
rule. This has been demonstrated by increased individ-
ual rights and freedoms, and a significant improvement
in the economic welfare of the Greek people. The fact
remains that a democratic political system is not in
operation in Greece, and the new leaders have given no
indication that it will be in the near future. The di-
lemma for the United States, as outlined by Secretary
Davies, is still applicable.
This period of American/Greek relations can, if viewed
objectively, be a valuable source of experience from which
we can draw in formulating future policies toward the new
military government in Greece. Although the ruling fig-
ures have changed, the new Greek leaders present many of
the same arguments justifying their takeover and their
goals for Greek society as did their predecessors seven
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years ago. Indeed, many of the leaders are members of
the 1967 junta and only recently turned against Papa-
dopoulos because they believed he was carrying out the
liberalization process in too rapid a manner and had
created for himself a "personality cult." * With a
new military government in power, the situation is such
that it may be an opportune time for the United States
to review the last seven years of American efforts to
aid Greece along her return road to democracy and eval-
uate the efficacy of our foreign policy towards the Greek
military government.
A review of the last seven years reveals some gen-
eral, characteristics of the Greek situation and America's
foreign policy efforts to deal with this problem, and
lessons that can be learned from the experiences. Pirsz
of all, both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations
have viewed strategic military advantages as overriding
considerations of political ideology. This can be most
clearly seen by public statements and congressional
testimony in which administration spokesmen emphasize
the role Greece plays in NATO, the importance of this
alliance to American security interests, and indica-
tions of reluctance to take any action which may jeop-
-* See "Another Junta in Athens," Time , December
10, 1973, pages 66-67.
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ardize the advantages provided by Greece. As has been
testified to by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Eurooean Affairs, Russell Pessenden:
. . .the concern about the constitutional govern-
ment situation in Greece is one that we very
definitely take into account both as it affects
opinion in this country and elsewhere in Europe
but I don't think it would be entirely honest
of me if I were to say that that was the over-
riding concern in all of our policy towards
Europe and the Near East. It is a factor which
we must take into account. . .but not one that
is so great that it would dominate and overrule
some of the more basic concerns we have about
maintaining the strength of NATO, maintaining
an adequate NATO and U. S. posture in the Mid-
dle East and so forth. 1 32
Secondly, the return of Greece to democratic pro-
cesses, if carried out by the present governmental di-
rectors, may well be a long process whose timetable will
only marginally be affected by low key American pressures.
Greek government leaders have frequently stated that they
will decide when the conditions of Greek society are amen-
able to a return to representative government, and the
last seven years have shown that they are in no great
hurry to return the system to the control of the Greek
populace
.
Thirdly, in accomplishment of American foreign policy
goals, the United States has been somewhat successful in






in Greece and maintaining the viability of the Greek/
American military relations, but has failed to realize
the second horn of the dilemma, a democratic Greece.
Although we have attempted to make a clear delineation
between military and political considerations, the ef-
forts have been largely ineffective as military aid and
political contacts are still viewed as proof of American
support of the military regime.
Finally, the most important variable has to be in-
cluded, that of the desires and views of the Greek people.
It is in this determination that the greatest degree of
difficulty is encountered. Because of the very nature
of the present Greek state, with the metropolitan sec-
tor of Athens under fluctuating degrees of martial law
and the remainder of the countryside under less con-
spicuous degrees of police and military control, a true
measure of how much popular support is enjoyed by the
military government is difficult to gauge by normal
methods. Supporters of the government point to the
victories scored in the plebiscites held in 1968 and
1973 as adequate proof of widespread support, while op-
ponents state that the elections were held under the gun
of a restrictive system, and the large majorities ob-
tained give additional credence to their claims because




Perhaps of more revealing consequence is the largely-
apathetic behavior of the Greek people themselves. Even
with inclusion of acts of extremism such as incidents of
bombings, internal opposition has been infrequent, of
relatively small scale, and generally limited in partici-
pation to students and what could be described as the
normally "liberal" elements of Athenian society, i.e.
construction workers and other labor segments. The only
broad-based demonstration held was on the occasion of
George Papandreou's funeral in November 1968, and it can
be safely stated that large segments attended to pay
their last respects to a popular Greek leader, and were
not there primarily in opposition to the government in
control. Although there are a few political leaders in
Greece that provide periodic enunciations of opposition
to specific programs or statements of the government, the
most vocal opposition comes from ex-political leaders who
are in exile (either forced or voluntary), base their
knowledge of Greek events on reports from "underground"
sources, and after seven years of opposition to the
government, have still been unable to find a common base
on which to unite their individual efforts.
As has been testified by many observers who have had
extended visits to Greece in the past few years, the Greek
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people appear to be pacified. While retaining a deep-
seated desire for the return of democratic functions,
they nevertheless are pleased with their increased econ-
omic status, accept the stability provided to the poli-
tical arena, and tolerate the loss of some individual
rights for the overall increased security provided by
the military government.
With the new opportunities provided by the recent
change in Greek leadership and with the above lessons
in mind, the United States should modify its "soft-line"
foreign policy towards Greece to present a firmer posi-
tion regarding the democratic transition and a more uni-
fied pursuance of this policy by the various practitioners
Specifically, this modification would include: increased
application of pressure by the American Ambassador urg-
ing the new leaders to resume the democratization pro-
cess as soon as possible; increased public statements of
concern over Greece's progress towards democracy expres-
sed by American officials in Greece as well as in the
United States; a strongly-worded request for a timetable
or plan of transition with estimated completion dates
for given phases; and a general policy statement that
based on the structural developments and reforms com-
pleted by the Greek military governments since their as-
sumption of power in 1967, the United States believes the
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necessary framework for a democratic Greece is sufficiently
in place to accomplish the return to democratic processes
and believes it to be in the best interests of the Greek
state to do so in the near future.
In addition to the above lessons learned, other fac-
tors make a hardening of the American position desirable
at this time. The risk in weakening the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization through withholding military aid
from Greece has decreased with the improved material
status of Greek forces and the overall decreased ten-
sions between the East and the West through detente and
an unravelling of the complex Middle East situation. Al-
though Greece no longer receives military grant aid, she
still is largely dependent upon credit sales and American
investments, thereby making it unlikely that she will be
able to assume a long-term, independent economic or poli-
tical course. Also with the homeporting of a Carrier
Task Group Commander in Athens, the frequently objected
to visits by high-ranking naval officers will reduce in
visibility as the other flag officer visits in the Medi-
terranean will be in other ports while the resident com-
mander 1 s returns to homeport will lack the protocol nor-
mally accompanying visits of American admirals to foreign
ports.
In carrying out this revised policy, the United States
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has to retain the flexibility of action so as not to make
our relations with the Greek government a "cooperate or
else" proposition. It is not desirable to force the
government into a position where a break with the United
States is seen as the only way to protect Greek sover-
eignty. Irregardless of whether the United States takes
action or not, she will be accused of intervention in
Greek domestic affairs. Those who oppose the Greek
government will see "non-action" as de facto American
approval of the regime, and the government may see any
opposing action as undue interference. Increased Ameri-
can pressures may not affect the eventual outcome of the
Gre-ek situation; however, we do have to consider our own
political principles in making it clear to the people
and government of Greece that the United States favors
the return of Greece to representative government and
will co-ordinate its actions as well as its statements
to the accomplishment of this goal. Finally, it must be
re-emphasized that, as has been pointed out by Secretary
Rogers and other observers of the Greek scene, in the
final analysis the actual accomplishment of the return
of Greece to the membership of democratic nations and
the future of the Greek state itself will be determined
by the Greek people.
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